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INTRODUCTION 
At the most recent bilateral summit in Goteborg, Sweden, on June 14, 
2001, President George W. Bush's first such summit, the European Union 
(E. U.) and the United States agreed to push together for a new round of 
multilateral trade negotiations. A joint statement advised, "[ w ]e seek a 
round that will lead both to the further liberalization of world trade and to 
clarifying, strengthening and extending [World Trade Organization 
(WTO)] rules, so as to promote economic growth and equip the trading 
system to meet the challenges of globalization."1 This statement presages 
much more than further development toward a world market. It contains 
the dual significance of both the emergence of a world government and the 
E.U.-U.S. partnership in constructing that government? 
• Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. L.L.M., 
University of Chicago, 1975; J.D., George Washington University, 1969; B.A., University 
of Maryland, 1966. I would like to thank Lan Cao. 
1. Goteborg Statement: Summit of the United States of America and the European 
Union, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 904, 906 (June 18, 2001), available at 
http://www.access.gpo.gov; see also President's News Conference with European Union 
Leaders in Goteborg, Sweden, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 899, 900-01 (June 18, 2001) 
(affirming the strong E.U.-U.S. trade relationship and the need to create a growing world 
economy), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov. 
2. This partnership is similar to that between France and Germany that led to the 
creation of the E.U. See L. NEVILLE BROWN & TOM KENNEDY, THE COURT OF JusTICE OF 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 1 (5th ed. 2000) (providing that in 1950 the French Foreign 
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As the United States enters this new phase, the U.S. legal community 
must fully understand the implications ofU.S. adherence to the goal of lib-
eralization of world trade on national policy and, ultimately, on national 
sovereignty.3 The free trade movement is part of a general and irresistible 
movement toward a global community.4 The global trade movement will 
have an impact well beyond national trade policy. The softening of trade 
borders will result in a more general concession of national sovereignty to 
supranational institutions. The U.S. legal community, even more so than 
other U.S. communities, must understand the nature of this move toward 
"global federalism . ., 
Fortunately, U.S. lawyers are intimately familiar with a federal legal 
system. In some senses, U.S. lawyers need only shift their perspective so 
that instead of working with a system in which the national government 
relates to the several states, they envision operating in one in which the na-
tional government relates to supranational governments, a perspective 
similar to the U.S. states in relation to the federal government. Still, the 
global legal system is nascent, it is not the mature U.S. federal system, and 
U.S. lawyers must be prepared to operate at a more formative stage. And, 
they must be prepared to deal with global institutions influenced by an 
Minister proposed to "place the whole of French and Gennan coal and steel production un-
der a common High Authority'' where other European countries could participate). 
3. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has served since 1947 as a 
framework for several global free trade negotiations by means of dispute resolution. See 
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
51-52 (2d ed. 1999). GATT made no provision for formal, judicial dispute resolution. See 
id. That process changed in 1994 when the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions agreed on dispute settlement procedures, known as GATT 1994. See Final Act Em-
bodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 
1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. I (1994), 33 I.L.M. 
1140, 1154. The Uruguay Round of Multilatera1 Trade Negotiations also established the 
WTO, embodied in the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO 
Agreement). See id. at 1143. GATT 1994 covers dispute resolution issues arising out of the 
WTO, and is incorporated in Article II of the WTO Agreement as Annex lA. See id. at 
1144-45, 1154. Article III establishes the WTO's general authority to resolve disputes 
among members, and provides that "[t]he WTO shall administer the Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes . . . in Annex 2 to this Agree-
ment." /d. at 1145. 
4. This globalization trend creates opportunities for assumption of power by adjudi-
cators outside trade as well. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
asserted jurisdiction to determine the crimina1ity of U.S. political and military leaders. The 
emerging International Criminal Court will assume jurisdiction throughout the world. 
Henry Kissinger observed, "[t)hese innovations reflect the new conventional wisdom, ac-
cording to which traditional principles of sovereignty and noninterference in the domestic 
affairs of other countries are the principle obstacles to the universal rule of peace and jus-
tice." HENRY KISSINGER, DOES AMERICA NEED A FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD A DIPLOMACY 
OF THE 21ST CENTURY? 234 (200 I). 
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ever-widening array of governmental and legal cultures. Both present op-
portunities as well as drawbacks. 
Insight into the natural evolution of a free trade regime may be gleaned 
from the fifty-year march toward the current E.U., which began with the 
signing of the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty in 1951. The 
European Economic Community, known popularly as the "Common Mar-
ket," was established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome.5 This initial treaty 
has been amended on occasion to form a constitution or "basic law." Each 
iteration resulted in an added centralization of authority, memorialized by 
the name change to the "European Union."6 Indeed, the E.U. has always 
been understood as a work-in-progress, and its members have agreed to "an 
ever closer union."7 Recently, the German government has proposed a true 
federal government much like its own, but the other members are not ready 
for formalization of that degree of unification. 8 
The E.U. experience serves here as an eye-opening case study. The fo-
cus of the initial effort was on economic cooperation. George Bermann ob-
served, "[ d]ifficult as it may now be to believe, the founders of the Com-
munity appear to have expected the Community institutions to intervene 
only in very specific ways in the Member State economies."9 The evolu-
tionary process from this narrow vision to the E.U.'s robust and broad 
authority provides valuable insights as the United States draws further into 
a global trade regime. 
Although U.S. lawyers have some two hundred years of historical expe-
rience, the recent E.U. experience might serve U.S. lawyers as a means to 
update their understanding of centralization.10 The E.U.'s well-defined and 
5. See BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 1-5 (providing a general history of the 
creation of a court of justice that would subject the European organization to judicial con-
trol). 
6. See Treaty of Amsterdam: Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Union, Oct. 2, 1997, in I INTERNATIONAL LAW & WoRLD ORDER§ I.B.I3c (Bums 
H. Weston & Jonathan C. Carlson eds., 2000) [hereinafter E.U. Treaty] (providing, "(t)his 
Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples 
of Europe"). 
7. Seeid. 
8. The German state itself resulted from the progression asserted here. The several 
Germanic entities began to coalesce in 1833 with the establishment of the Zollverein, a 
German customs union. See A.NKE FRECKMANN & THOMAS WEGERJCH, THE GERMAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM 19 (1999). 
9. George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European 
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331, 355 (1994). 
10. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Federalism and Liberalism, 4 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. 
L. 329, 334-36 (1996) (observing a natural tendency of the U.S. federal government into 
areas where it has no general "constitutional" power). 
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aggressive legislative structure has played a crucial role in centralization.11 
U.S. lawyers, however, might profitably focus on the potential role of su-
pranational tribunals in the evolution of a global legal regime, and in the 
origins of the legal principles upon which decisions will be made. There-
fore, this article is limited to developing understanding of the centralizing 
influence of judicial review with reference to the E.U. experience. 
E.U. developments further serve as a valuable vision of the emerging 
global legal regime, because a world legal regime, at least its frrst stages, 
will derive from a melding of U.S. law representing the common law legal 
tradition, and E.U. law representing continental legal culture. Thus, this 
Article, with the aid ofE.U. judicial developments, hopes to serve two pur-
poses. First, this Article discusses the social policy scope of the commit-
ment to a free trade regime and the natural shift from sovereign nations to 
supranational, ostensibly trade-oriented, organizations. Second, this Article 
demonstrates how free trade commitments might be understood quite dif-
ferently by those from other legal cultures, particularly those trained in the 
continental legal culture dominating the law emerging from the E.U., and 
hence how the partnership of the E.U. and U.S. legal communities might 
impact the development of global review principles. 
1. THE EFFECf OF SUPRANATIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW ON NATIONAL 
SOVEREIGNTY 
The judicial role in the drive to a "more perfect union" is not unknown 
to U.S. lawyers, particularly the part played by the U.S. Supreme Court 
11. See Treaty of Amsterdam: Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, Oct. 2, 1997, in l INTERNATIONAL LAW & WORLD ORDER§ I.B.13d 
(Bums H. Weston & Jonathan C. Carlson eds., 2000) [hereinafter E.C. TREATY). E.C. 
Treaty Article 7 (ex Article 4) establishes five institutions: the European Parliament, the 
Council, the Commission, the Court of Justice, and the Court of Auditors. See id. art. 7. 
The Council and the Commission are constituted so as to represent the member states. See 
id. arts. 203, 213. The first three are political institutions. The allocation of authority 
among these three institutions may be startling to U.S. lawyers unfamiliar with the E.U.'s 
legislative process, whereas it may not seem extraordinary to those familiar with parlia-
mentary governments. See BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 8 (stating, "European Par-
liament is more like a national parliament."). The Commission, which also administers the 
laws, has sole authority to initiate legislation and the Council has final enactment authority. 
See id. at 11. The Parliament, which is directly elected by E.U. citizens, has various types 
of review· or approval authority. See id. at 8. In general, Parliament has the power to stop or 
at least make legislation more difficult but the Council, with the advice of the Commission, 
has the final say. See id. at 8-10. The latter two institutions may be comparable in a parlia-
mentary system to the "government," where the leadership of the dominant party or parties 
controls legislation as well as the executive. Hence Europeans may be more comfortable 
with this allocation of power. Still, each major treaty has given parliament more power in 
response to claims of a "democracy deficit" and this trend is likely to continue. 
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(U.S. Court). The role of the European Court of Justice (E.U. Court) in 
centralizing authority might not be well understood by U.S. lawyers, and 
yet that E.U. institution is particularly important to envisioning the evolu-
tion of global federalism. 12 While the United States brings its own history 
and experience to centralization of power issues, the E.U. 's evolution and 
the E.U. Court's role is more recent and its citizens and member nations 
will be more sentient in the initial steps from a trade regime to a suprana-
tional sovereignty. This section then seeks to use E.U. judicial review to 
predict the role global tribunals might play in global federalization. (Paral-
lelism is sought here by referring to the European Court of Justice as the 
"E.U. Court" and the U.S. Supreme Court as the "U.S. Court"). 
A. Judicial Review in E. U. Centralization 
The role of judicial review of national or "Member State" actions pro-
vides a particularly valuable lesson for U.S. lawyers. Like the U.S. Court, 
the E.U. Court has been extremely activist, and the law it created in the 
E.U.'s formative stage forms the bedrock of a strong central authority. 
George Bermann summarized the E.U. Court's role, stating, "[t]he Court of 
Justice has thus taken virtually every opportunity that presented itself to 
enhance the normative supremacy and effectiveness of Community law in 
the national legal orders."13 Even though the E.U. Court has recently been 
more cautious, as discussed below, the legal doctrines it created are stiiJ a 
major unifying force. 
The birth of the E.U. was largely the result of a partnership between 
France and Germany, 14 although there were six founding members.15 In 
12. Under the basic law, E.U. judicial power is exercised by the European Court of 
Justice (E.U. Court). See E.C. TREATY arts. 220-45 (describing the judicial mechanisms of 
the European Court of Justice). E.C. Treaty Article 220 provides "(t]he Court of Justice 
shall ensure that in the interpretation and application ofthis Treaty the law is observed." Id. 
art. 220. U.S. lawyers may perceive the E.U. Court of Justice as the Supreme Court of 
Europe. 
13. Bermann, supra note 9, at 353. 
14. See BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 8 (stating that France and Germany 
wanted to establish an organization open to other European countries). 
15. The six founding members are: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands. See BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 2, at I. The E.U. currently has 
fifteen member states. Nine members have been added: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, 
Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Twelve nations have begun the 
process of joining the E.U.: Cyprus, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Latvia, Bulgaria, and Romania. See EURECOM, SWEDES MAKE 
STRIDES TOWARDS EU ENLARGEMENT (July/Aug. 2001), at http://www.eurunion.org/news/ 
eurecom/2001/eurecom070801.htm. As of August 2001, the first three had closed two-
thirds of the negotiating chapters and all but the last two had closed more than half. See id. 
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E.U. Court case law, "where conflicts arise, the various approaches of the 
French, German, and more recently English legal systems, as well as those 
Member nations must be balanced."16 In many ways, a humble Germany 
gave way to France. Therefore, the E.U. Court was modeled after the 
France Conseil d 'Etat. 17 This choice is significant in procedures and judi-
cial attitude. The attitude of the Conseil d'Etat has traditionally been much 
more activist than most European courts.18 
Those with some understanding of the Conseil d'Etat will understand the 
E.U. Court's processes. Otherwise, its processes are quite foreign to U.S. 
lawyers and challenges their notions of appropriate process and proper: ju-
dicial decision making. Therefore, a brief description of the E.U. Court's 
composition and procedures, with special attention to points of interest for 
U.S. lawyers, seems necessary. 
The E.U. Court consists of fifteen judges and eight advocate generals, 
but planned enlargement will result in expansion. The E.U. Court hears 
cases in "chambers" of three to seven judges. Judges serve a term of six 
years with the prospect of reappointment. Of particular relevance to this 
discussion, Article 223 provides that "[judges] shall be appointed by com-
mon accord ... of the Member States."19 Although a representative from 
each state is not thereby required, as it is with the ultimate legislative 
authority, the "Council," this phrase assures that each state will have a rep-
resentative because each can and do insist.20 
Certain procedural aspects may also astound American lawyers. In 
many ways, the procedures have the feel of U.S. appellate proceedings but 
differ in fundamental ways. The first stage is the written application. This 
is not really pleading because it must contain, in effect, the applicant's 
whole case. The defendant has one month to respond, challenging "admis-
sibility" (e.g., jurisdiction and standing) and merits or substance. At this 
point, the process significantly deviates from any U.S. judicial proceedings. 
The parties' control virtually ends and the E.U. Court takes over. One of 
the judges is assigned the case and serves as a "judge-rapporteur," respon-
sible for building the record. The record will serve as the basis for a deci-
16. See JURGEN SCHWARZE, EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9 (1992) (providing that 
judgments of the E.U. Court of Justice can sometimes have political consequences). 
17. See L. NEVILLE BROWN & JOHNS. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 266 (4th 
ed. 1993) ("[In procedures and composition] is to be seen the greatest resemblance between 
the European Court and the Conseil d'Etat."). 
18. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW 
WORLD 11 (1954) ("[The Council of State's] decisions were swayed just as much by policy 
as by law."). 
19. B.C. TREATY art. 223. 
20. For an overview of the organization and processes of the Court, the appointment of 
judges, and the selection of Advocates-General, see genera11y B.C. TREATY, supra note I I. 
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sion. Witnesses are heard as part of the investigation and they are wit-
nesses to the E.U. Court's, not to the individual party's. Evidence may also 
be taken in written form. The investigation may, but not necessarily, be 
followed by an oral hearing of an oral argument nature. The "Advocate 
General" then considers the case. Nothing in the U.S. system equates to 
this judicial officer in the Court's operation. The Advocate General is part 
of the E.U. Court and prepares an opinion to "assist" the Court. Although 
the extent to which the E.U. Court adopts the Advocate General's opinion 
may vary, it is invariably extremely important. 
The judgment is reached in a secret meeting ofthe E.U. Court (without 
the attendance of the Advocate General)?1 The Court delivers a collegial 
judgment. The opinion is sparse, to say the least, by U.S. standards. 
Therefore, the Advocate General's opinion is often more illuminating, even 
if the E.U. Court does not agree. Also, the opinion is not attributed to an 
individual judge and there are no individual opinions, including dissents. 
While U.S. lawyers may find collegial judgments interfere with "reading" 
the Court, the practice does not seem to inhibit of the evolution of the law. 
Like the U.S. Court, the E.U. Court has jurisdiction to enforce the basic 
law against both E.U. institutions and Member States.22 The Court may 
void an act of an E.U. institution. More to the point, the Court may review 
actions by the Member States to determine if they have "failed to fulfill an 
obligation" under the treaty. A state must take necessary action to comply 
with the E.U. Court's judgment and, if it fails to do so, the Court may im-
pose a "penalty payment.'723 
Member compliance may also be questioned before national courts and 
the national court may refer such questions to the E.U. Court. The E.U. 
founders took the alternative approach to "inferior federal courts" in con-
trast to the drafters of the U.S. Constitution. They created only one central 
court and relied on national courts to a large degree. Moreover, unlike the 
U.S. federal court system, the E.U. Court may directly obtain a case from 
any national tribunal, from the highest national court to the lowest, even 
tribunals outside the judicial system.24 
21. See BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 65 (stating that the advocate general does 
not attend the meetings at which the judges deliberate). 
22. See B.C. TREATY art. 220 (providing "[t]he Court of Justice shall ensure that in the 
interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed"). 
23. See B.C. TREATY art. 228 (providing that if a Member State does not comply with 
the Court's order, the Commission will bring the case before the E.U. Court and impose a 
penalty payment). 
24. The Court of First Instance has limited potential jurisdiction under E.C. Treaty Ar-
ticle 225. The E.U. Court has appellate authority over the Court of First Instance and retains 
much of its original jurisdiction. See B.C. TREATY art. 225; see also E.C. TREATY art. 234 
(providing the areas over which the E. U. Court has jurisdiction and authorizing "preliminary 
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The basic law does not contain a supremacy clause, as does the U.S. 
Constitution. However, the E.U. Court, in an early display of its activism, 
recognized the supremacy of E.U. law in Costa v. Ente Nazionale Per 
L 'Engergia Elettrica, where the E.U. Court recognized: 
The transfer, by the States from their domestic legal system to the Community legal 
system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty, carries with it a perma-
nent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act in-
compatible with the concept of the Community, cannot prevail. Consequently Article 
177 is to be applied regardless of anr domestic law, whenever questions relating to 
the interpretation of the Treaty arise. 2 
Currently, E.C. Treaty Article 10 (the former Article 5 as applied in 
Costa) provides that Member States take all appropriate measures to ensure 
fulfillment of the obligations arising out of the Treaty or resulting from ac-
tion taken by the institutions of the Community, and notes that States 
should not undertake measures that may imperil the missions and purposes 
ofthe Treaty. Combined with the E.U. Court's enforcement jurisdiction, it 
becomes quite easy for an activist court to assert the supremacy of E.U. 
law, even without a supremacy clause as such. 
A much more significant step was the E.U. Court's willingness to derive 
its responsibility under the basic law from the general principles oflaw. As 
would be expected, these principles are founded on continental legal doc-
trine, largely that of France and Germany (suggesting a parallel with the 
likely E.U.-U.S. foundation for a global legal regime).26 This lawmaking is 
loosely based on E.U. Treaty Article 220's admonition that the Court en-
sure the treaty laws are observed. Nonetheless, it is conceded that these 
general principles are judicial creations. T. C. Hartley wrote, "[t]he general 
principles of law are, therefore, an independent source of law and there can 
be little doubt that the Court would have applied them even if none of the 
Treaty provisions ... had existed."27 
The Irish abortion case serves as a revealing example of the extent to 
which E.U. trade objectives authorize scrutiny of a state's constitutional as 
well as legislative law. The Society for the Protection of Unborn Children 
Ireland Ltd. v. Grogan questioned Ireland's authority to prohibit the distri-
rulings" from "any court or tribunal of a member state" on treaty interpretations, validity of 
E.U. acts, and interpretations of statutes of bodies established by the Council). 
25. Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale Per L'Engergia Elettrica. 1964 E.C.R. 585, 
594, [1964) C.M.L.R. 425,456 (1964). 
26. See BROWN & KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 351 ("Whenever the Court is faced with a 
question oflaw which is not resolved by any written Community text, it is likely to be influ-
enced by the laws of the Member States."). 
27. T. C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE CoNSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY 131 (4th ed. 1998). 
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bution of abortion related information.28 Three student organizations in-
cluded in their student guides information regarding contacting abortion 
clinics in the United Kingdom. Irish legislation makes it a criminal offense 
for a woman to have or attempt to procure an abortion. Following a refer-
endum in 1983, the legislature inserted a right to life provision into the 
Irish constitution. The E.U. Court first decided that the medical termina-
tion of pregnancy was a "service" under E.U. Treaty Article 50, which is 
protected under E.U. Treaty Article 49. Implicitly, it treated services in the 
same fashion as goods, so that any burden on trade, even in the absence of 
discrimination, is considered incompatible with the basic law. It thereby 
agreed with Advocate General Van Gerven's conclusion, which stated that 
"national rules which, albeit not discriminatory, may, overtly or covertly, 
actually or potentially, impeded intra-Community trade in services fall in 
principle within the scope of [the basic law]."29 In response to the argu-
ment that such activity was considered immoral as evidenced by the Irish 
Constitution, referendum, and laws, the Court held that because abortion 
was legal in some member states, it would not substitute its moral judg-
ment.30 Still, it held that the E.U. law did not protect the student organiza-
tions, but for reasons that were not particularly sensitive to Ireland's public 
policy concerns. It held that the prohibition was compatible because it was 
"independent of the economic activity." The freedom was assured for the 
clinics themselves or persons engaged in fee-paying services or advertising. 
This case is an enlightening example of the weight of authority assumed 
by the E.U. Court. The case demonstrates how easily a sensitive moral, 
philosophical, and social policy issue may be converted into a free trade is-
sue. Any of the E.U.'s so-called "four freedoms" (free movement of goods, 
workers, establishment, and services) might justify judicial review of non-
trade issues. A true free trade regime may not permit moral impediments, 
or the like, that might create obstacles to the free movement of goods, 
services, and people within the global market. 
Trade principles also necessarily justify a uniform approach to morality 
and public policy. On this issue, the Advocate General advised: 
Admittedly, those concepts may be defined to a considerable degree by the Member 
States. Yet that does not mean that they should not be justified and delimited in a 
uniform manner for the whole Community under Community law and therefore taking 
28. Case C-159/90, 1991 E.C.R. 1-4685, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. 849 (1991) (holding that a 
prohibition on the distribution of abortion information by a group unconnected with abortion 
providers is not contrary to Community law). 
29. Id. at 1-4715. 
30. See id. at 1-4739 (stating "[i]t is not for the Court to substitute its assessment for 
that of the legislature in those Member States where the activities in question are practised 
legally."). 
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into account the general principles in regard to fundamental rights and freedoms 
which form an integral part of Community law and the observance of which the Court 
is to ensure.31 
Imagine U.S. law being evaluated against a universal world morality. In 
this regard, consider how little impact the constitutional nature of the Irish 
law had on the Court and the fact that it was affirmed in a referendum. 
This case also demonstrates how easily international conventions can be 
brought into global legal principles and applied by a global court in the 
name of trade even against nations who are not signatory to those conven-
tions. The Court entertained a freedom of expression defense based on the 
European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention). Formally, E.U. 
law did not directly adopt the Convention, and individual members were 
left to adopt it. Even though it ultimately rejected the argument, it followed 
other cases in which E.U. law incorporated the Convention where incorpo-
ration fostered the single market objectives.32 Anne-Marie Slaughter ob-
served the impact of the law developed by the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) over courts outside Europe.33 Thus, the demonstrated ease 
of converting trade jurisdiction into authority to apply the ECHR's opin-
ions projects a similar move by a global trade tribunal relying on the views 
of various rights defining tribunals. Envision a global trade tribunal im-
posing a convention on the United States to which Congress has not agreed. 
B. Shifting Sovereignty in a Global Legal Culture 
The E.U. experience demonstrates the natural tendency toward federali-
zation in supranational organizations and the role judicial review plays in 
that movement. The WTO, even in its current form, presents the founda-
tion for a similar shift. 34 Its tribunals will play their own role in the shift of 
sovereignty to the supranational organization. This shift will reach, as in 
the E.U. experience, well beyond trade. 
John McGinnis and Mark Movsesian observed, "[t]he possibility of cov-
ert protectionism thus necessarily forces the WTO to address environ-
31. Id. at 1-4723 (emphasis added). 
32. See id. at 1-4741 (stating ''where national legislation falls within the field of appli-
cation of Community law the Court, when requested to give a preliminary ruling, must pro-
vide the national court with all the elements of interpretation which are necessary in order to 
enable it to assess the compatibility of that legislation with the fundamental rights-as laid 
down in particular in the European Convention on Human Rights-the observance of which 
the Court ensures.''). 
33. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1111 
(2000) (discussing how the ECHR possesses no formal authority over any courts outside of 
Europe). 
34. Supra note 3. 
2002] JUDICIAL REVIEW AND GLOBAL FEDERALISM 501 
mental, health, and safety issues."35 They offer two models: the anti-
discrimination model and the regulatory model. The former is much less 
intrusive on national law than the latter. The latter results in the WTO 
making global social policy regulations to replace national regulations re-
jected as inconsistent with a world market. These two pro-free trade com-
mentators warned that "in light of its academic and political support, the 
regulatory model will likely compete with the antidiscrimination model in 
shaping the WTO of the future."36 While both models presage significant 
shifts in sovereignty, their regulatory model suggests a more aggressive 
imposition of a global social policy on WTO member nations. It would 
particularly erode the sovereignty of less developed countries whose level 
of economic development cannot support environmental regulation and 
other social policies equivalent to that of more developed economies so that 
the drive for global uniformity will be more restrictive on their social pol-
icy choices and their freedom to attack what they find to be more pressing 
concerns. 
The E.U. experience supports a view that these commentators and many 
others in the United States might find disagreeable in terms of economic 
liberalization. This experience suggests a shift in national control of inter-
nal social policy: a shift of sovereignty. Early, the E.U. Court expressed 
the broad impact of the movement towards a single market. In Rewe-
Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung for Branntwein (generally know 
as Cassis de Dijon), the Court made E.U. policy that an internal market re-
quired more than a prohibition against discrimination.37 The German law 
applied equally to both imported and domestic products, but the Court as-
sumed the authority to question any "obstacle to trade."38 In short, the sin-
gle market goal demanded the elimination of any national regulation that 
inhibited any of the four freedoms, regardless of whether the regulation 
prejudiced goods, services, workers, or establishments from other Member 
States. 
More to the point, in response to national claims that such E.U. law pre-
vented Member States from protecting their citizens, the Court responded 
that the members should then promote the adoption of such protection for 
all E.U. citizens, all "Europeans." Thus, European law conforms to the 
regulatory model described above which McGinnis and Movsesian find is 
35. John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 
HARV. L. REv. 511,550 (2000). 
36. Id. at 552. 
37. Case 120ns, 1979 E.C.R. 649 (1979) (discussing trade within the European Com-
munity). 
38. Id. at 664. The case has that interpretation even though, or perhaps because of, the 
facts suggest that the German regulation was, in fact, discriminatory. 
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competing for global dominance. In this way, the Court shifted a substan-
tial body of social policy authority from the states to the E.U. institutions. 
A similar movement in the global trade regime seems likely. 
The general global trend towards devolution tempers, but does not mas-
ter this tendency.39 The E.U., despite the pressure for an ever-closer union, 
has not been immune from the devolution movement. Again, the E.U. ex-
perience suggests the future of global judicial review. The E.U.'s concept 
of shared power might presage a global future with an ebb and flow of na-
tional versus global sovereignty. 
The E.U. has embodied its notion of this conflict in the doctrine of"sub-
sidiarity." The doctrine of subsidiarity expresses a growing sense that the 
E.U. was detracting from member authority beyond that intended or wished 
by the members and their citizens.40 In short, it expresses a preference for 
social policy decision making at the level nearest those affected while still 
achieving the desired shared goal. E.C. Treaty Article 5 now expressly 
provides that in "areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, 
the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of sub-
sidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot 
be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore . . . be 
better achieved by the Community.'.41 
The E.U. controversy revolving around subsidiarity, the allocation of 
authority between the central authority and the states, is very familiar to 
U.S. lawyers. In U.S. constitutional law, the poles in this allocation are 
termed "Nationalist," which endorses a strong federal authority, and "Fed-
39. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experi-
mentalism, 98 CoLUM. L. REv. 267, 339-40, 445-47 (1998) (stating domestic experimental-
ism, whereby governmental agencies are free to set their own goals and essentially act as a 
self-governing unit, represents a shift toward balancing the ideals of limited government and 
an all-powerful government purportedly acting in the best interest of the citizenry); see also 
Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J. CoMP. L. 
205, 206-07 (1990) (defining devolutionary federalism as a constitutional order that redis-
tributes authority from a centralized entity to sub-parts, which then assume their own 
authority over the matter). The European Community is an example of a supranational con-
stitutional system that has embraced devolutionairy federalism. See id. at 207-11. 
40. The doctrine began to emerge from several different venues in the early 1980s. 
The 1992 Maastricht Treaty, formally the Treaty on European Union (TEU), incorporated 
the concept into the basic law. There has been a discussion of the Amsterdam Treaty's 
treatment of subsidiary and the experience with that principle between the TEU and the Am-
sterdam Treaty. See Christian Timmermans, Subsidiarity and Transparency, 22 FoRDHAM 
INT'L L.J. Sl06, Sl27 (1999) (concluding Judge Pescatore "feared that subsidiarity would 
set us back into the dark times of anarchy of the nation states. I am happy to say now in 
1998 that after five years of subsidiarity, the Community is still very much alive."). 
41. E.U. TREATY art. 5. 
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eralist," which favors considerable retention of authority by the states.42 
U.S. federalism and subsidiarity contrast in ways that might inform any 
predictions about the future of shared authority between global authority 
and its national members. 
George Bermann urged that equating E.U. subsidiarity with U.S. feder-
alism "is misleading and possibly false.'.43 He distinguished the two con-
cepts, arguing "U.S. federalism places greater emphasis on the presence of 
an overall balance of power between the federal government and the states 
than on respect for any single rule for allocating competences among the 
different levels of government.'>« U.S. federalism principles may look to 
an array of justifications for centralized decision making in a particular area 
of public policy. Subsidiarity focuses only on whether the relative capaci-
ties of federal and state government can deal "effectively" or "adequately" 
with the problem or policy at hand.45 In applying it, central action may be 
taken only in areas of shared jurisdiction, whereas U.S. federalism relies on 
the political branches to make the necessary public policy trade-offs.46 
That is, E.U. subsidiarity places the burden on the E.U. institutions, in-
cluding the E.U. Court, to demonstrate that centralization is superior but 
U.S. federalism makes the centralization choice a political question. 
Thus, global review based on U.S.'s federalism concepts would allow 
future global political authorities to entertain trade-offs between global and 
national resolution of an issue. Global review based on E. U. 's subsidiarity 
would force the global authority to demonstrate that it was superior in a 
given context. Thus, the E.U. concept trusts more concrete borders, 
whereas the U.S. concept trusts the soundness of institutional divisions of 
labor. 
IT. THE SHIFT FROM NATIONAL TO GLOBAL REVIEW PRINCIPLES 
The federalization process also forces national legal principles into a 
complex matrix in which various existing national and global legal princi-
ples interact. Anne-Marie Slaughter observed both the "vertical" relations 
and "horizontal" relations among national and supranational courts.47 
42. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REv. 
1141, 1145-49 (1988) (describing how the two models are applied in the context of the ap-
portionment of government powers between the states and the federal government). 
43. Bermann, supra note 9, at 453. 
44. /d. at 450. 
45. /d. at 451. 
46. See id. at 452 (stating that subsidiarity "entails approaching federalism with the ... 
attitude that federal action should be taken in areas of shared competence only if the goal in 
question cannot adequately be achieved by action at the state level or below."). 
47. See generally Slaughter, supra note 33, at 1112 (stating these relations are leading 
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Therefore, U.S. law increasingly affects not only the evolution of global 
law, but also the evolution of national laws throughout the world and that 
law affects U.S. law as well. This shift introduces a new complexity into 
national law well beyond international trade oriented practice. 
The Wheat Gluten case considered by a WTO panel provides an exam-
ple of the new dimensions facing U.S. nationallaw.48 There the United 
States argued that the E.U.'s assertion of a "proportionality rule" consti-
tuted a proposed a "novel standard" of the E.U.'s own "invention." A look 
into this assertion illuminates the tensions in the merger of common law 
legal culture, as manifest in U.S. review law, and the continental legal cul-
ture, as manifest in E.U. review law. It shows the entwining of global and 
various national legal doctrines. 
The E.U. accused the United States of establishing a quantitative restric-
tion on the importation of wheat gluten in violation of General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).49 The U.S. International Trade Commission 
(ITC) determined that wheat gluten was being imported into the United 
States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious 
injury to the domestic industry. The United States adopted a "definitive 
safeguard measure" placing a quantitative restriction on certain imports. 
The E.U. requested the establishment of a WTO panel to inquire into the 
safeguard measure. Among other challenges, it asserted that the ITC's ac-
tion violated the principle of proportionality. 
It further asserted that Article 5 of the Safeguard Agreement (SA) estab-
lished that review principle with the language that a "Member shall apply 
safeguard measures only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy seri-
ous injury and to facilitate adjustment."50 The E.U. contended "[SA Article 
5] is the application of the proportionality principle ... As the ITC itself 
acknowledged in its report, a quantitative restriction is the most extreme 
and restrictive measure that a Member could take. It is the most trade-
disruptive measure of all possible measures."51 
Thus, it urged "the principle of proportionality under Article 5.1 did not 
allow the United States to choose a quantitative restriction without having 
demonstrated that the applied measure was the least trade restrictive meas-
to an emerging judicial comity). 
48. See REP. OF THE PANEL, UNITED STATES-DEFINITIVE SAFEGUARD MEASURES ON 
IMPORTS OF WHEAT GLUTEN FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (July 31, 2000), available 
at 2000 WL 1146580. 
49. See id. § 2.9 (stating about eighty percent of the wheat gluten consumed in the 
United States is used by the milling and baking industries), available at 2000 WL 1146580 
at *6. 
50. Agreement on Safeguards, art. V, Apr. 15, 1994 (1994). 
51. See REP. OF THE PANEL, supra note 48, at Attachment 1-l, § 131, available at 2000 
WL 1146580 at *85. 
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ure possible."52 The dispute settlement body did not reach this specific ar-
gument because it found that the United States had violated other, more ex-
pressed, GAIT requirements. Therefore, it was unnecessary to decide 
whether to transport E.U. law into WTO law, especiaJly over U.S. objec-
tions. 
The panel was able to save itself the task of dealing U.S. parochialism. 
Far from being a "novel invention," the principle of proportionality has a 
long history in continental review law. As a general principle of law in 
Europe, it quickly became an integral part of E.U. review law and is now 
considered a fundamental, perhaps dominant, aspect of that law. The prin-
ciple is a product of German law.53 It has spread throughout Europe and it 
has become widely accepted in continental European law. Even the com-
mon law English courts have increasingly expressed themselves in such 
terms. 
A few E.U. cases will provide a sense of how proportionality is used to 
create judicial authority over an array of national policy choices. In Com-
mission v. French Republic, the E.U. Commission brought an action 
against France under E. C. Treaty Article 226 for failing "to fulfil [sic] an 
obligation under this [t]reaty."54 A French regulation required registration 
and labeling of medical "reagents"; chemical or biological substances spe-
cially prepared for use in vitro for medical biology analyses.55 The Com-
mission noted that since "the [enforcing E.U.] Commission ... does not 
dispute that the contested decree pursues an objective of the protection of 
public health, the issue of the dispute is confined to whether the provisions 
at issue comply with the principle ofproportionality."56 The test is whether 
the regulation was "necessary to attain the objectives of protection being 
legitimately pursued .... "57 The Court agreed with France that the regis-
tration requirement was necessary because registration furthered detection 
of unreliable or ineffective reagents.58 However, the Court struck down the 
labeling regulation, holding that "[i]n view of the existence of less restric-
52. Id. at Attachment 1-6, § 98, available at 2000 WL 1146580 at *175. 
53. See HARTLEY, supra note 27, at 145 (stating that Verhiiltnismlissigkeit or propor-
tionality is regarded as underlying certain provisions of the German constitution). 
54. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE 
TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, art. 
226, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J., (C 340) 1 (1997). 
55. Commission Decree 96/351 of 19 April 1996, J.O., April 26, 1996 O.J. (L 761-14-
1) 6386. 
56. Case C-55/99, Commission v. French Republic, 2000, available at http://curia. 
eu.int, '1!20. 
57. /d. '1!29 (emphasis added). 
58. See id. 'II 35 (describing obligations and duties of the government in creating the 
data bank of reagents and maintaining the filing systems of those reagents). 
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tive means, the obligation at issue does not therefore comply with the prin-
ciple of proportionality."59 This case is among those that demonstrate how 
the principle of proportionality empowers the court to delve deeply into 
national policy choices not directly related to trade. 
The connection between trade and the failure of the regulation was more 
direct in Commission v. Italian Republic, but the case is otherwise instruc-
tive in how stringent review under that standard might be.60 The regula-
tion's objective was to protect the national citrus crop from the importation 
of damaging disease. The national government issued a decree limiting the 
points of entry of grapefruits. The Commission, in another enforcement 
action against a Member, urged that the regulation was not essential.61 The 
Court, however, struck down the regulation because lesser alternatives 
were not "impossible.'.62 The Court did not accept administrative difficul-
ties as sufficient justification. 
Proportionality may even serve to question judgments regarding the ad-
ministration of legal requirements. In Sudzucker Manheim/Ochsenfurt AG 
v. Hauptzollamt Mannheim, the E.U. Court considered whether imple-
menting rules were proportionate.63 Commission sugar regulation required 
as proof of compliance certain endorsements on an export license. The 
customs office refused to accept equivalent proof and the exporter ap-
pealed. On reference, the E.U. Court noted that "[w]here Community leg-
islation makes a distinction between a primary obligation ... and a secon-
dary obligation, essentially of an administrative nature, it cannot, without 
breaching the principle of proportionality, penalise failure to comply with 
the secondary obligation as severely as failure to comply with the primary 
obligation."64 In this case, however, it found that the prescribed formality 
was part of the primary obligation, hence compliance could be penalized 
without violating the proportionality.65 Although this case actually re-
59. /d. 'II 45. See also Case C-478/98, Commission v. Kingdom of Belgium, 2000, 
available at http://curia.eu.int, '1!59 (stating that proportionality "must not go beyond what is 
necessary in order to attain [an appropriate objective}."). 
60. See generally Case C-128/89, Commission v. Italian Republic, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3239 
(stating Member States may not impose unfair trade restrictions on each other or erect ob-
stacles to the free movement of goods across borders). 
61. See id. 'II 8 (noting the Commission found the grapefruit import policy to be dis-
criminatory and in breach of the tenet of proportionality). 
62. See id. '11'11 24-28 (concluding Italy's grapefruit import procedures violated B.C. 
law). 
63. See Case C-161/96, 1998 Report of Cases Before the Court of Justice and the Court 
of First Instance I-281. 
64. Id.'Pl. 
65. See id. 'II 43 (noting that compliance with customs formalities are part of the obli-
gations of the Member State in connection with the proper functioning of a quota system for 
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viewed an E.U. regulation, enforced by a national agency, it serves as an 
example of the reach of proportionality review. 
The importation of such a fundamental E.U. review principles will be ir-
resistible. The process whereby proportionality, as an example, entered the 
E.U. Court's review responsibility demonstrates the borrowing and nego-
tiation that will form global review principles. Proportionality is a univer-
sal concept in E.U. law, but it originated in German, not French law.66 
Similarly, a review principle, here proportionality, representing a funda-
mental part of one dominant legal system, the E.U. and Europe, is urged by 
that system on the supranational tribunal. The American system finds it 
novel and doubts its legitimacy. Like the Court of Justice, a global tribunal 
will likely adopt a principle familiar to a significant legal culture despite 
the initial resistance from another significant culture. Indeed, one might 
expect a common law advocate, perhaps even the United States, to assert 
the principle if doing so will serve its purpose. 
So, proportionality is not novel to E.U. law and it is not surprising that 
the E.U. would argue for its inclusion in WTO Jaw. Indeed, Article 5 lan-
guage quoted by the E.U. must have seemed to continental lawyers repre-
senting the E.U. a clear expression of the principle. Similarly, the WTO's 
Dispute Settlement Understanding Article 3.2 defines a dispute settlement 
body's job as ''providing security and predictability."67 This language may 
have no special meaning for U.S. lawyers but European lawyers may see it 
as adopting the principle of "legitimate expectations" or "legal certainty." 
This principle became part of E.U. review law from both German and 
French review principles. Applying it, a court must assure that the gov-
ernment may not unilaterally disturb settled legal relationships. In its 
French expression, it refers to "legal security" (securite juridique), which 
precisely matches the understanding in the originallanguage.68 Consistent 
with the WTO language, it is understood to require predictability.69 Thus, 
legitimate expectations is another example of a European review principle 
goods). 
66. See ScHWARZE, supra note 16, at 680, 685. 
67. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art. 
3.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, An-
nex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. l, 33 I.L.M. 1226 
(1994). 
68. See HARTLEY, supra note 27, at 139 (stating the three most important sub-aspects 
of legal certainty (or legal security) are non-retroactivity, vested rights, and legitimate ex-
pectations). 
69. See JAMES HANLON, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 63-65 (2d ed. 2000) (comment-
ing the principle of predictability is found in the legal systems of all Member States, and 
involves the principles of legitimate expectations and non-retroactivity, which is defined as 
precluding a measure from taking effect before its publication). 
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that will find its way into WTO review even though it is not a part of U.S. 
law. 
This vertical impact of principles from other cultures can also be ex-
pected to have indirect horizontal impact on U.S. law. Global review's 
adoption of principles borrowed from other nations will transform U.S. 
principles so that the principles of other legal cultures will migrate through 
global review into U.S. law. The acceptance ofE.U. review principles into 
the English, i.e., common law, legal culture might presage the impact of 
globalization on U.S. national review law. The change in judicial attitude 
in England attributed to the duty to enforce E.U. law is considered dra-
matic. 7° Continental review principles themselves are also finding their 
way into English law. For example, English law increasingly recognizes 
proportionality and legitimate expectation.71 Robert Thomas described 
how proportionality has become part of English law, and how pressure to 
apply E.U. law "may create an osmotic or 'spill-over' effect of European 
law, whereby principles which need only be applied by the national court 
when it is concerned with Community law may nevertheless filter through 
into the court's elaboration of domestic law."72 Lord Denning, who seems 
to have added legitimate expectation review to English law, asserted that he 
thought of it himself.73 Foreign review principles are fmding a place in the 
review arsenal of the English judiciary. Whether borrowing is conscious or 
not, the general continental usage of the principle no doubt helps legitimate 
arguments for its adoption in England. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, "regarded by many foreign judges and lawyers 
as resolutely parochial," has increasingly observed foreign principles.74 As 
in England, proportionality is a plausible candidate for the gradual impor-
tation into United States law as other legal culture participate in global ju-
dicial process. The judicial application of concepts embodied in the princi-
ple of proportionality are not unknown in U.S. law. While it is not a formal 
review principle in the U.S., reviewing U.S. courts, as their English coun-
terparts, often reason in ways that suggest the principle. A particularly 
70. See WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 15-17 (8th 
ed. 2000) (describing the movement in the English courts to move away from "unfettered" 
administrative discretion and toward a system protecting individual rights through due proc-
ess). 
71. See generally ROBERT THOMAS, LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS AND PROPORTIONALITY: 
IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2000). 
72. ld. at 39. 
73. See id. at 47 (noting that Lord Denning claimed that the concept of legitimate ex-
pectation "'came out of my own head and not from any continental or other source."'). 
74. Slaughter, supra note 33, at 1117, 1118-19 (contending that Justices Breyer and 
O'Connor along with Chief Justice Rehnquist are particularly willing to consider foreign 
legal principles). 
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relevant example is the judicial test for determining the appropriateness of 
legislation under section 5 of the 14th Amendment. The U.S. Court struck 
down application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 
to states because it was disproportionate. States challenged the amendment 
of the act to include state employees. The U.S. Court considered whether 
Congress abrogated sovereign immunity under the 11th Amendment 
through the powers granted by section 5 of the 14th Amendment in Kimel 
v. Florida Board of Regents.15 Finding that Congress intended to abrogate 
state sovereign immunity, the Kimel Court then considered whether it could 
validly do so. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the U.S. Supreme Court consid-
ered whether the means adopted were narrowly tailored to achieve the de-
sired end. 76 Conceding that Congress has wide latitude, the Court noted 
that "[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury 
to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."77 In 
Kimel, it held that "[t]he substantive requirements the ADEA imposes on 
state and local governments are disproportionate to any unconstitutional 
conduct that conceivably could be targeted by the Act."78 
In all these ways, participation in a world trade regime means U.S. law 
cannot remain an isolated legal island and U.S. lawyers will no longer be 
immune from the principles of other legal cultures. For an ever-widening 
range of legal disciplines, attention must be given to global legal doctrine 
and the principles from other legal cultures that will affect global adjudica-
tions. The future of U.S. law in many areas may also see national law as-
similating the principles from other legal cultures as they become more fa-
miliar. 
CONCLUSION 
The above is not an anti-free trade demonstration, but an alert to U.S. 
lawyers that the practice of U.S. law has fundamentally changed. Moreo-
ver, while nearly every aspect of U.S. law will feel the affect of globaliza-
tion, U.S. public law, and the U.S. public policy behind it, will continue to 
~el the most immediate impact as the United States enters the global legal 
culture. The effect is both vertical and horizontal, involving the interaction 
75. 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (holding that Congress exceeded its authority under the 
.14th Amendment). See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (''The Congress shall have the 
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article"). 
76. 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993 exceeded Congress's 14th Amendment enforcement powers). 
77. /d. at 520. 
78. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 63. "A review of the ADEA's legislative record as a whole re-
veals that Congress had virtually no reason to believe that state and local governments were 
unconstitutionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of age." /d. at 64. 
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between national law and global law and between our legal culture and 
those of other systems. 
This Article then expresses some urgency. For one thing, U.S. lawyers 
must take steps . to understand the effect of globalization, particularly the 
global trade regime, on national law. Perhaps more importantly, this is the 
point at which the U.S. legal community, particularly those engaged in 
public law, can affect the fundamental principles of the global legal culture. 
The two dominant legal cultures in the globalization will be the United 
States, representing the common law systems and its own public policy 
embellishments, and the E.U., representing an amalgam of the continental 
legal systems. These two legal cultures will form the basis of the global 
legal system, as did Germany and France in the formative years of E.U. 
law. 
Inevitably, globalization will result in an increasing shift of sovereignty 
from the national government to global institutions. This Article discusses 
two aspects of that shift in sovereignty. First, it explores a shift resulting 
from the emerging free-trade regime, which may not be obvious to many 
U.S. lawyers. Second, it suggests a change in judicial lawmaking, which 
will result, or has begun to result, from globalization. 
The fifty-year effort to create a single European market demonstrates the 
shift of sovereignty necessary to accomplishing that goal, and hence is in-
structive in predicting the future of a global free trade regime. A single 
market was found impossible without attacking national laws and national 
public policy. Thus, the E.U. Court, along with the other E.U. institutions, 
had to question separate national standards even if not protective or dis-
criminatory. Not only can it be confidently predicted that global trade re-
gime must similarly evolve, but the WTO, even though much weaker than 
the E.U. government, has already begun that process. 
More subtle is the shift in the sovereignty of national courts. Again, the 
E.U. experience is instructive. The initiating legal cultures of Member 
States set the foundation for E.U. law. However, over time, the direction 
has shifted so that increasingly E.U. law or uniform principles began to af-
fect national law. As national law could be measured against the uniform 
European legal principles, control over national law shifted from national 
courts, along with national governments in general. Moreover, national 
law itself began to accommodate and incorporate general principles identi-
fied by E.U. law. Both national law and E.U. legal development became a 
complex matrix. Particularly instructive for U.S. lawyers is this effect on 
the one common law culture in the E.U., that ofthe United Kingdom. 
The operational point is that a broad range of members of the U.S. legal 
community, as well as other public policy participants, must become active 
in the global regime. This point must be embraced by those other than the 
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trade or international legal community because global development will in-
sinuate itself into most aspects of U.S. law and public policy. The relative 
parochialism of the U.S. legal community is a severe handicap, but U.S. 
lawyers have advantages, one of which is that U.S. lawyers are comfortable 
with a federal system.79 While considerable catching up is in order, U.S. 
lawyers are well equipped to deal with the concept of global federalism. 
79. See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Introduction: Globalization of Administrative and Regu-
latory Practice, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 409 (2002). 
